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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how financial, trade, institutional and political liberalization 
policies have affected financial sector competition in Africa using updated data to appraise 
second generation reforms. The ‘freedom to trade’ and ‘economic freedom’ indices are 
employed. Hitherto, unexplored financial sector concepts of formalization, semi-
formalization, informalization and non-formalization are also introduced. The following 
findings are established. Firstly, relative to money supply: (1) with the exception of the 
economic freedom mechanism, liberalization policies have generally decreased the growth of 
the formal financial sector to the benefit of other financial sectors; (2) apart from the foreign 
direct investment and economic freedom channels, liberalization policies have been fruitful 
for semi-formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors and; (3) with the 
exception of economic freedom, both the informal and non-formal sectors have developed 
owing to liberalization to the detriment of the formal financial sector. Secondly, relative to 
GDP, the semi-formal, informal and/or non-formal financial sectors have also generally 
improved as a result of liberalization. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
  
With the International Financial Statistics (2008) financial system definition 
debunked, the informal financial sector can no longer be marginalized in macroeconomic-
based analysis in the face of burgeoning phenomena of mobile banking and knowledge 
economy. Accordingly, while the International Financial Statistics (2008) definition
2
 of the 
financial system by the International Monetary Fund fails to take the informal financial sector 
into account, recent financial development literature has incontrovertibly shown a substantial 
positive correlation between the informal financial sector and soaring trends of mobile 
banking (Asongu, 2013a) and knowledge economy (Asongu, 2012a) in developing countries. 
Understanding the role of liberalization policies (especially second generation policies) in 
financial development from a sector-competition standpoint is of policy relevance for five 
main reasons. Firstly, the competitive dimension is of critical importance because the chain of 
structural and policy adjustments (at the financial, economic and political levels that were 
enshrined in the second generation financial reforms) had the ultimate goal of given impetus 
to economic growth as well as improving overall economic and financial efficiency (Janine & 
Elbadawi, 1992). Secondly, the role of financial reforms in financial development in 
developing countries is crucial because financial intermediation has been substantially 
documented as indispensible in channeling mobilized resources to economic agents. Thirdly, 
contrary to developed countries, a great chunk of the monetary based in developing countries 
does not transit through the formal banking sector, hence the informal financial sector can no 
longer be put on the margin from a macroeconomic perspective. Fourthly, as recently 
documented, over the past decade the growth of information and communication technologies 
has been substantially captured by the informal financial sector for the most part (Asongu, 
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 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics, October, 2008.  
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2013a)
3
. Fifthly, the recent wave of financial crises has brought renewed interest in the fierce 
debate about the lofty goals of liberalization policies and their implications for financial 
development, especially in developing countries (Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012b).  
 The global financial crisis has dramatically unraveled the downsides of liberalization, 
as many emerging and developing economies (which had to grapple with surges in capital 
flows earlier in the last decade) are now experiencing a sharp reversal of those inflows as a 
result of the crisis (Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012b). Financial channels that have greased 
the economic downturn have resurfaced old demons about the ambitions of financial 
globalization and its implications for growth and volatility (with a particular emphasis on 
developing countries). The spirit motivating this fear is the fact that, according to theoretical 
postulation the benefits of financial liberalization are expected to be higher in developing 
countries
4
. The current wave of liberalization policies began in the 1980s with growing cross 
border financial flows among industrial economies as well as among developing countries. 
This was facilitated by the liberalization of capital controls in many of these countries since it 
was widely anticipated that growing cross-border flows would generate higher appeals in 
terms of better capital allocation and improve possibilities of international risk-sharing. 
Accordingly, there has been a consensus among economic policy makers that the benefits 
ought to be large in developing countries that have more volatile income growth and tend to 
be relatively capital-poor (Kose et al., 2006).  
                                                 
3
 It has been recently documented that, mobile banking is negatively correlated with traditional macroeconomic 
dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. By relaxing the International Financial Statistics (2008) 
definition on which the indicators are based and considering a previously missing informal financial sector, 
mobile banking is found to be highly positively correlated with this formerly marginalized informal financial 
sector.  
4
 From a theoretical view, financial globalization should ease the efficient international allocation of capital and 
promote international risk sharing. These benefits should be much higher for developing countries because they 
are relatively capital scarce and labor rich. Hence, access to foreign capital should help them increase investment 
and growth (Asongu, 2012b). Moreover, developing countries have more volatile output than advanced 
industrial countries which increases their potential welfare gains from international risk sharing (Kose et al., 
2011).  
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 With the surge in financial inflows, came a spade of currency and financial meltdowns 
in the late 1980s and 1990s. This pattern set the course for some change of vision in policy-
making and academic circles, with some  scholars advocating that developing countries 
opening-up their capital accounts have been more vulnerable to crises (and correspondingly 
more adversely affected) than their industrial counterparts (Kose et al., 2011; Henry, 2007; 
Asongu, 2012b). These developments have ignited a fierce and heated debate among 
academics and practitioners over the appeals of liberalization policies. While the debate over 
the positive gains from trade liberalization has been less heated and biased towards a 
consensus (Kose et al., 2006), that on the appeals of other liberalization policies (especially 
capital account openness) has intensified and become even more polarized (Asongu, 2012c). 
 Most African countries embarked on a chain of structural and policy adjustments at 
the financial, economic and political levels in the 1980s and 1990s. While a substantial bulk 
of the literature has examined the impact of financial reforms on financial development 
(Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Batuo et al., 2010; Asongu, 2012c), 
surprisingly, as far as we have reviewed there is currently no study that has investigated the 
incidence of these reforms (that targeted economic and financial efficiency) on financial 
sector competition. Hence, drawing from the experience of a continent that has been 
implementing development financial reforms, this study aims to investigate the incidence of 
liberalization policies on financial sector competition. This paper has a threefold contribution 
to the literature.  
 First, consistent with O’Toole (2012) many studies have been limited to more specific 
elements of the banking market structure like bank concentration and foreign bank 
participation. We steer clear of this mainstream approach by focusing on banking sector 
competition. While a substantial bulk of the literature has examined the impact of financial 
reforms on financial development (Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Asongu, 
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2012c), we argue that failure to introduce the informal financial sector that captures 
burgeoning financial activities (as highlighted in the first paragraph) is a substantial missing 
link in the literature. Accordingly, this contribution also draws from the burgeoning 
phenomenon of knowledge economy (Asongu, 2012a) and soaring mobile banking activities 
(Asongu, 2013a) that are captured by the informal financial sector for the most part.  
 Second, the present paper unites two streams of research by contributing at the same 
time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responding to 
the growing field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion, 
microfinance, mobile banking, knowledge economy…etc, in suggesting a practicable way to 
disentangle the effects of various liberalization policies on financial sectors. Hence, we 
introduce measures of absolute and relative ‘informal financial sector importance’ as well as 
hitherto unexplored concepts of financial sector formalization, semi-formalization, 
informalization and non-formalization.  
 Third, by employing a plethora of liberalization policies (financial, trade, institutional, 
political et al.), we present a broad and exhaustive picture of the nexuses among liberalization 
policies and financial sector importance. Moreover, as opposed to past studies, the use of an 
updated data span (1996-2010) that captures second generation reforms provides results with 
more focused and updated policy implications.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents 
the theoretical highlights and discusses the relevant literature before presenting propositions 
for testing the hypotheses challenging existing views. The data and methodology are 
discussed in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Theoretical highlights, literature, hypotheses and propositions  
2.1 Theoretical highlight, finance and development  
2.1.1 Theoretical highlights 
 
 Consistent with Fugazza & Fiess (2010), the conventional view sustains that 
liberalization would cause a rise in informality. Though the consensus is not universal, it is 
widely believed that globalization (especially) trade liberalization would increase competition 
for domestic producers. Accordingly, in attempts to mitigate production cost, domestic 
producers will seek to informally produce inputs from cheaper sources in order to reap of the 
benefits from informal production because informal producers for the most part do not 
comply with fiscal and legal regulations. In essence, increasing demand for informally 
produced commodities is expected to increase the informal sector in the aftermath of 
liberalization.  
 
2.1.2 Background and motivation  
 Consistent with Batuo & Asongu (2014), most African countries under constraints by 
the Bretton Woods institutions embarked on a series of structural adjustment policies in which 
financial, trade, political and institutional liberalizations were central. Inter alia, the 
liberalization measures entailed policies that promoted free trade, deregulation, price controls 
and rationing, elimination of subsidies and privatization or downsizing or public services 
(Woodward, 1992; Asongu, 2014a). Trade, financial and institutional reforms are the most 
discussed forms (Batuo & Asongu, 2014).   
 Firstly, the objective of trade liberalization was that, removing trade barriers will lead 
to overall short-term welfare gain as well as poverty and inequality mitigation. In the medium 
term, trade liberalization is expected to stimulate economic growth and reap the efficiency (or 
static) rewards of trade. In the long-term, the potential positive effects include: the benefits of 
scale and competition; the flexibility induced by relying on market signals, and the constraints 
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on government incompetence or corruption (Grossman & Helpmann, 1991). Secondly, the 
goal of financial reforms was to improve financial and economic efficiency as well as provide 
impetus to growth (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992). Consistent with Batuo et al. (2010), first 
generation reforms adopted entailed: abolishing explicit controls on pricing and allocation of 
credit, relaxing controls on international capital movements, allowing of interests rates to be 
market-determined and reduction of direct government intervention in bank credit decisions. 
On the other hand, the second generation of reforms focused on institutional and structural 
adjustment constraints, rehabilitation of financial infrastructure, restoration of bank soundness 
and amelioration of supervisory, regulatory, institutional and legal environments.  
 Third, the dimension of institutions is the liberalization policies is crucial because, it is 
evident that the ability to design and implement structural adjustment programs is 
substantially a consequence of political commitment, skills, capacities and the independence, 
probity and competence of the bureaucracy. This institutional dimension surfaced because of 
failures and setbacks of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s as well as the functional 
and normative ideals of the politics of neoliberal thinking which were at the center of the 
strategies of Bretton Wood institutions (Batuo & Asongu, 2014). 
 In light of the above, relative to African states, many East Asian countries have 
achieved remarkable economic growth and development without better espousing the policies 
of the Bretton Wood institutions: a contradiction that is most relevant in the financial sector 
(O’Toole, 2012). In essence, Andersen et al. (2012) have pointed to the fact that countries in 
the fastest growing region in the world over the past two decades (of East Asia and the 
Pacific), have recorded the lowest levels of financial reforms as measured by Abiad et al. 
(2010). It follows that the relevance of foreign-led reforms in Africa for financial 
development could be questioned in light of the East Asian success story. As O’Toole (2012) 
has noted, in assessing how financial reforms have led to financial development Andersen et 
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al. (2012) has failed to isolate the potential channels via which the financial reforms could 
affect economic growth. The purpose of this paper is also to indirectly fill this gap in the 
African finance literature by considering three main financial sectors: formal, semi-formal 
and informal. Moreover, as sustained by Batuo & Asongu (2014), the liberalization literature 
has been limited to only a few dimensions of implemented policy reforms. This study is also a 
response to a recommendation by the authors to exhaustively assess the plethora of 
liberalization policies for more policy options.  
 
2.1.3 Liberalization and financial sector activities  
 While the operations of the informal financial sector are not regulated, policies 
formulated by authorities affect them indirectly, whether favorably or adversely, essentially 
because informal finance inherently complements the formal component (Hoff & Stiglitz, 
1998; Adeusi et al., 2012). Despite the fact that a substantial chunk of the monetary base 
circulates outside the formal banking sector in African countries, researchers have 
predominantly used financial development benchmarks of developed countries to assess 
financial development in the continent (Cho et al., 1986; Arestis et al., 2002; Ataullah et al., 
2004; Al-Obaidan, 2008; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010). In essence, while liberalization policies 
targeted the formal financial sector for the most part, their incidence on other financial sectors 
has been relatively limited (Adeusi et al., 2012) and remained a ‘black box’ (Hyuha et al., 
1993). An example of how liberalization policies affected informal finance could be 
understood from the higher prices charged by banks which paved the way for the expansion of 
the informal financial sector (Adeusi et al., 2012). Moreover, liberalization of the Information 
and Communication Technology sector has accelerated the burgeoning phenomenon of 
mobile banking that has substantially improved the informal banking sector to the detriment 
of the formal sector (Asongu, 2013a).  
 Consistent with Aryeetey (2005), in spite of institutional and structural reforms, there 
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has remained a credit gap in the financing of small and medium size enterprises that could 
only be filled by the informal and semi-formal financial sectors. According to the author, as 
would be expected by new structuralist economics, there are pressures on informal financial 
units to provide appropriate supporting finance to the private sector. According to this 
narrative under competitive market conditions, when firms fail to secure formal loans, they 
would obviously replace them with informal finance. Today, the substantially documented 
issues of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions is an indication that the 
liberalization measures implemented by countries in this continent might have substantially 
affected the informal financial sector due to credit rationing and information asymmetry in the 
formal banking sector (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014b,c)
5
.  
 In fact, how liberalization has affected both formal and informal sectors as well as the 
changing contributions of the informal sector have remained crucial issues in the literature 
(Bairagya, 2010). According to the author, for all industrial units including small home-based 
enterprises in the informal sector, liberalization exposed to the inherent risk of free market 
competition. Hence, the incidence of economic liberalization generally fit on both formal and 
informal sectors (and the entire economy). For example, the shares of informal and informal 
sectors in terms of productivity, employment, income to the whole economy have been 
changing with the advent of liberalization activities. This is part of the motivation for the 
‘financial sector competition’ intuition of this paper6. Accordingly, a substantial body of the 
literature has pointed to the little scholarly attention received on the nexus between 
liberalization and informality (Bairagya, 2010; Fugazza & Fiess, 2010). As far as we have 
reviewed, most of the literature that has addressed these issues have focused on the economic 
                                                 
5
 In fact the literature has already covered exhaustive case studies showing how institutions deteriorated with the 
advent of liberalization policies. Consistent with Asongu (2011a), this is the case of many developing countries 
in Africa (Lemarchand, 1972), Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972), India (Wade, 1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 1977); post 
1990 communist countries like Russia (Varsee, 1997) and many Latin American countries upon different waves 
of democratization (Weyland, 1998). 
6
 Sector competition is even more evident because Bairagya (2010)   has concluded that linkages between the 
formal and informal sectors help grow the informal manufacturing sector.  
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implications of liberalization (Chaudhuri & Banerjee, 2007; Chaudhuri et al., 2006; 
Chaudhuri & Mukherjee, 2002; Ghosh & Paul, 2008; Beladi & Yabuuchi, 2001; Marjit & 
Kar, 2007; Marjit & Maiti, 2005). The few studies that have assessed the financial 
implications of the phenomenon have failed to rethink the basic premises for the relevance 
financial indicators (Aryeetey, 2005; Adeusi et al., 2012) 
 
2.2 Rethinking financial development indicators and first generation solutions  
 As underlined by recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2012a, 2013a), financial 
development indicators have been universally employed without due regard to country- and 
regional-specific financial development contexts or realities. Accordingly, the use of 
indicators is simply motivated by a presumption of universal validity (Gries et al., 2009)
7
. To 
the best of our knowledge, only a few papers have been directly focused on the quality of 
financial indicators with respect to development contexts (Beck et al., 1999; Asongu, 2012a, 
2013a). A plethora of studies have identified the issues but failed to directly tackle them 
(Demetriades & Hussein, 1996; Khumbhakar & Mavrotas, 2005; Ang & McKibbin, 2007; 
Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn; 2008). Therefore, a substantial bulk of the literature is consistent 
with the position that, financial depth in the perspective of money supply is not equal to liquid 
liabilities in every development context: essentially, because a great chunk of the monetary 
base in certain countries circulates outside the formal banking sector. We discuss the 
remainder of this section in two strands: the context of the problem and first generation 
solutions.  
 The issue revolves around the International Financial Statistics definition of the 
financial system that is biased toward developed countries. According to this definition, while 
the financial system consists of the formal and semi-formal financial sectors, the informal 
                                                 
7Gries et al. (2009) state: “In the related literature several proxies for financial deepening have been suggested, 
for example, monetary aggregates such as Money Supply (M2) on GDP. To date there is no consensus on the on 
the superiority of any indicator” (p. 1851).  
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financial sector is marginal
8
. However, recent literature has demonstrated the relevance of the 
informal financial sector in Knowledge Economy (Asongu, 2012a) and mobile banking 
(Asongu, 2013a) that are substantially mitigating African income inequality (Asongu, 2013b).  
 In essence, money supply which represents the money stock in an economy has been 
used for decades as the standard measurement of liquid liabilities (World Bank, 1989; King & 
Levine, 1993). While this appreciation is quasi-true in the developed world, its relevance in 
developing countries has been substantially questioned. Critics have emphasized that in less 
developed nations, an improvement in money supply may reflect an extensive use of currency 
instead of an improvement in formal financial system deposits (liquid liabilities). Two 
generations of solutions have emerged in attempts to address the concern.  
 To the best of our knowledge, first generation solutions consist of a strand of studies 
that have questioned the universality of the International Financial Statistics’ financial system 
definition. While this class of studies has identified the concern, it has addressed it only 
superficially without given due consideration to the informal financial sector. First, some 
authors have addressed the shortcoming by subtracting currency outside banks from money 
supply in the measurement of liquid liabilities (Demetriades & Hussein, 1996; Abu-Bader & 
Abu-Qarn, 2008). Second, another class of authors has sought to address to issue by deriving 
an indicator that broadly reflects financial depth. They have employed the first principal 
component of money supply and a plethora of other financial indicators (Khumbhakar & 
Mavrotas, 2005; Ang & McKibbin, 2007; Gries et al., 2009). This approach decreases the 
dimensionality of a set of highly correlated variables into an indicator or index without the 
loss of much information from the initial dataset. Hence, problems related to the quality of 
money supply as a proxy for liquid liabilities are mitigated. The principal setback of this 
solution is that money supply is juxtaposed with concepts of financial allocation efficiency 
                                                 
8
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the IFS (2008).  
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(bank credit/bank deposits), financial size (deposit bank assets/central bank assets plus deposit 
bank assets), financial activity (private domestic credit)…etc. A common feature in the above 
two strands of solutions is the complete neglect of the informal financial sector.  
 Asongu (2012a, 2013a) has tackled these concerns by neither marginalizing the 
informal financial sector nor juxtaposing financial development concepts. He has provided a 
practicable way of disentangling the effects of the formal, semi-formal and informal financial 
sectors encompassed in money supply.  
 
2.3 Propositions from second generation solutions and hypotheses  
 The second generation solutions proposed are motivated by the incorporation of the 
informal financial sector. As shown in Appendix 1, this previously missing component is 
integrated into the conception and definition of the financial system.  We also decompose the 
existing measurement by the International Financial Statistics into its formal and semi-formal 
components. Table 1 below presents the propositions. While Panel A presents GDP-based 
measures, money supply indicators are presented in Panel B. Whereas improvements in the 
shares of propositions in the first panel are broad and relative to the general economic 
prosperity of a nation, improvements in the shares of propositions in the second panel are 
relative to money supply, implying one financial sector improves its share in money supply to 
the detriment of other sectors. Hence, they are measures of financial sector importance and/or 
competition (Asongu, 2013c). Propositions 1 & 5, 2 &  6, 3 & 7, and 4 & 8 respectively 
represent formal, semi-formal, informal and non-formal (semi-formal & informal) financial 
development.  
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Table 1: Summary of propositions 
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators 
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation 
Proposition  1 Formal  financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits9  here refer to demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks. 
Proposition  2 Semi-formal  
financial development 
(Financial deposits – Bank 
deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits10 are demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions. 
Proposition  3 Informal  financial 
development 
(Money Supply – Financial 
deposits)/GDP 
 
 
Proposition  4 
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development  
(Money  Supply –  Bank 
deposits)/GDP 
 
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance 
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalization 
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalization)11 . 
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization’ 
(Financial deposits - Bank 
deposits)/ Money Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-formalization)12. 
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
(Money Supply – Financial 
deposits)/ Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalisation)13. 
Proposition 8 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization and 
informalization’  
(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ financial 
development: (Semi-formalization and 
informalization) 14 
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one); arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector importance. Hence, when 
their time series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one sector is to the detriment of other sectors and vice-versa.  
 
 In light of the preceding sections, the empirical section shall examine the following 
testable hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: Liberalization improves the competitiveness of the formal financial sector. 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 5 will tackle this hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2: Liberalization improves the competitiveness of the semi-formal financial sector. 
Proposition 2 and Proposition 6 will address this hypothesis. 
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 Lines 24 and 25 of the International Financial Statistics (October 2008).  
10
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics (2008).  
11
 Accordingly, in undeveloped countries money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities or bank deposits. While 
in undeveloped countries bank deposits as a ratio of money supply is less than one, in developed countries this 
ratio is almost equal to 1.  This indicator appreciates the degree by which money in circulation is absorbed by the 
banking system.  Here we define ‘financial formalization’ as the propensity of the formal banking system to 
absorb money in circulation. 
12
 This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal 
and informal sectors. 
13
 This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment 
of formal and semi-formal sectors.  
14
 The proposition measures the deterioration of the formal banking sector in the interest of other financial 
sectors (informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be almost perfectly 
antagonistic, meaning the former (formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors) and the 
latter (formal sector deterioration) should almost display a perfectly negative degree of substitution or correlation 
(See Appendix 2).  
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Hypothesis 3: Liberalization ameliorates the competiveness of the informal financial sector. 
Proposition 3 and Proposition 7 will tackle this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: Liberalization improves the competiveness of the non-formal financial sector. 
Proposition 4 and Proposition 8 will address this hypothesis.  
  In the light of the theoretical and empirical underpinnings covered above, the 
hypotheses and propositions challenge existing views in at least four dimensions: (a) the 
definition of the financial system; (b) disentangling the existing measurement into formal and 
semi-formal financial sectors; (c) adding the previously missing informal sector to the 
definition and; (d) the challenge of assessing channels of liberalization for potential poverty 
mitigation is for the first time seen from various financial sector lenses because of recent 
evidence on the substantial relevance of informal finance in African development (Aryeetey, 
2005; Adeusi et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013a,b,c; Meagher, 2013). How these challenges to 
existing conceptions contribute to existing literature has already been substantially covered in 
the introduction.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We assess a panel of 28 African countries with annual data from the African 
Development Indicators of the World Bank, Chinn & Ito (2002), Gwartney et al. (2011) and, 
the Financial Development and Structure Database for the period 1996 to 2010
15
. Limitations 
to the number of countries and periodicity of analysis have a twofold justification: (1) 
constraints in data availability on institutional quality and; (2) the motivation of capturing the 
effects of second generation reforms (that targeted institutional and structural constraints) in a 
bid for more focused and updated policy implications. 
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 We restrict our sample to African countries because of their relatively lower levels in formal financial 
development and higher need for informal sector promotion.  Unlike in the developed world, the informal and 
semi-formal financial sectors play an important role in the economic prosperity of developing countries (Ang & 
McKibbin, 2007; Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn, 2008).  
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The dependent variables are absolute and relative measures of financial sector 
competition recently documented in the financial development literature (Asongu, 2012a). 
These variables as defined in Appendix 2 are the result of a rethinking of the International 
Financial Statistics (2008) financial system definition that does not incorporate the informal 
financial sector into its definition of the financial system
16
. Hence, by relaxing the 
International Financial Statistics (2008) definition and introducing a previously missing 
informal financial sector (as well as disentangling the pre-existing measurement into its 
constituent components), absolute and relative financial development indicators have been 
theoretically proposed and empirically validated in recent financial development literature 
(Asongu, 2012a, 2013a).  
For the independent variables, we distinguish among five types of liberalization 
policies: financial, trade, institutional, political and other liberalizations. (1) Financial 
liberalization is proxied with: de jure capital account openness (KAPOPEN), developed by 
Chinn & Ito (2002); and de facto capital account openness (foreign direct investment: FDI). 
KAOPEN is the first principal component of four binary indicators in the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and it takes higher values for 
more open financial regimes. We are motivated to add subtlety to the analysis by 
complementing KAOPEN with FDI because: the former may not capture the actual ebb and 
flow of cross border capital and its impact (Aizenman et al., 2009); the private sector often 
circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory capital 
controls (Edwards, 1999) and; more recently, China’s de facto openness, despite its de jure 
closeness has been subject to discussion in research circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman 
& Glick, 2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2009). (2) Trade liberalization is measured by trade openness 
and exports. Whereas the former is the sum of imports and exports of commodities as a % of 
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 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics, October, 2008.  
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GDP, the latter only consists of commodity exports on GDP. (3) Institutional liberalization is 
the first principal component of six government quality indicators: corruption-control, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulation quality, political stability and voice & 
accountability. (4) Political liberalization is measured by the Democracy index. (5) Other 
liberalization measures include: economic freedom and ‘freedom to trade’ (Gwartney, 2011).  
‘Freedom to trade internationally’ is an index encompassing: taxes on international trade 
(international trade tax revenues as % of trade sector; mean tariff rate and standard deviation 
of tariff rates); regulatory trade barriers (non tariff trade barriers and compliance cost of 
exporting and importing); size of trade sector relative to expected; black market exchange 
rates and international market capital controls (‘foreign ownership /investment’ restrictions 
and capital controls). Economic freedom broadly represents: legal structure and security of 
property rights; freedom to trade internationally; access to sound money; size of government 
(expenditures, taxes and enterprises) and; regulation of credit, labor and business. These 
liberalization measures have been used in recent African financial literature (Asongu, 2013d; 
Batuo & Asongu, 2014).  
Control variables include: inflation, government expenditure, human development, 
economic prosperity (GDP growth), foreign aid and population growth. The expected sign of 
inflation is unclear. While low and stable inflation rates generally provide a favorable 
environment for financial development, high inflation on the other hand, does quite the 
opposite. In addition, recent African finance literature has established a negative association 
between inflation and financial intermediary allocation efficiency (Asongu, 2013a). Economic 
prosperity, human development and population growth should be positive to financial 
development (Asongu, 2011b). The effects of development assistance and government 
expenditure are contingent on the quality of institutions. They would naturally improve 
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financial development if  the  budget  allocated  for  investment  is not  misallocated  through  
corrupt  practices (Ndikumana, 2000).  
The ‘summary statistics’ (Panel A of Table 2) of the variables used in the panel 
regressions reveals that there is quite some variation in the data utilized so that one should be 
confident that reasonable estimated nexuses should emerge. Countries examined are presented 
in Panel B of Table 2. Details about the correlation analysis (showing the nexuses among key 
variables used in the study), and variable definitions are presented in the appendices. The 
object of the correlation matrix (Appendix 3) is to explore issues resulting from 
overparametization and multicollinearity. Based on a preliminary analysis of the correlation 
coefficients, there do not appear to be any disturbing issues in terms of the relationships to be 
estimated. In Appendix 2, the variables are defined and the corresponding sources revealed. 
Table 2: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obser. 
       
GDP-based 
financial  
development 
indicators    
Proposition 1 0.255 0.204 0.036 0.935 363 
Proposition 2 0.003 0.010 -0.007 0.097 419 
Proposition 3 0.050 0.055 -0.292 0.198 419 
Proposition 4 0.053 0.057 -0.290 0.244 419 
       
 
M2-based financial 
development 
indicators    
Proposition 5 0.749 0.161 0.175 1.456 360 
Proposition 6 0.011 0.036 -0.024 0.224 360 
Proposition 7 0.238 0.161 -0.457 0.824 360 
Proposition 8  0.238 0.161 -0.457 0.824 360 
       
Financial 
Liberalization 
KAOPEN  -0.505 1.278 -1.843 2.477 392 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 2.777 4.252 -8.629 36.114 346 
       
Trade 
Liberalization 
Trade  68.687 29.967 21.574 187.68 401 
Exports  30.245 14.618 5.820 69.032 401 
       
Institutional & 
Political 
Liberalizations 
Institutional Index 0.088 2.152 -4.569 5.233 320 
Democracy   3.263 3.959 -8.000 10.000 224 
       
Other 
Liberalizations  
Freedom to Trade  6.060 0.917 3.400 8.100 250 
Economic Freedom   6.118 0.632 4.710 7.820 250 
       
 
 
Control Variables  
 
 
Inflation 7.239 9.496 -100.00 46.561 395 
Government Expenditure 4.304 10.670 -34.882 61.364 298 
Human Development 1.913 8.0128 0.204 47.486 341 
Economic Prosperity  4.273 3.710 -16.740 27.462 420 
Foreign Aid 9.447 8.946 -0.251 54.785 392 
Population growth  2.275 0.741 0.042 4.146 420 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Niger, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic.  
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
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3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis  
 Principal component analysis is a method used to reduce variables numbers. Due to 
the high correlation among various good government quality indicators, one might question 
the redundancy of some information. Therefore, we use principal component analysis to 
reduce the dimensions of: government-effectiveness, voice & accountability, rule of law, 
corruption-control, regulation quality and political stability. Principal component analysis is a 
widely employed statistical technique used to reduce a larger set of correlated variables into a 
smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components that account for most of the 
information in the original data set. In the selection of the principal components, the criteria 
applied to determine how many common factors to retain are obtained from Kaiser (1974) & 
Jolliffe (2002). The authors recommend a Kaiser 1 criterion which consists of selecting 
principal components with an eigenvalue greater than one because it represent a substantial 
portion of common information among the set of correlated variables. Therefore, only a 
principal component with an eigenvalue greater than one is retained. As shown in Table 3 
below, the first principal component is appropriate since it has an eigenvalue of 4.705 and 
represents more than 78% of information in the institutional indicators combined. This first 
principal component will subsequently represent the institutional liberalization index. 
 
Table 3: Principal Component Analysis for Institutional Index (Instidex) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 V & A R.L R.Q G.E PS CC    
First  P.C 0.369 0.435 0.412 0.425 0.388 0.416 0.784 0.784 4.705 
Second  P.C -0.690 0.103 0.258 0.436 -0.453 0.227 0.083 0.867 0.499 
Third P.C -0.591 0.187 -0.299 -0.051 0.724 0.002 0.054 0.922 0.327 
P.C: Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. 
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3.2.2 Estimation technique  
When compared with cross-country analysis, estimation with dynamic panel data has 
some important upsides and one downside (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008). On the positive 
side: (1) it makes use of both time series and the cross sectional variations in the data; (2) in 
cross-country regressions, the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the error term, so 
that correlations between the error term and the exogenous variables results in biased 
estimated coefficients. More so, in cross-country regressions, if the lagged dependent variable 
is included among the explanatory variables, the country-specific effect is certainly correlated 
with the regressors. A measure of controlling for the presence of the unobserved country-
specific effect is to first-difference the regression equation to eliminate the country-specific 
effect and, then make use of instrumental variables to control for endogeneity
17
. Addressing 
the endogeneity concern is the second positive side of dynamic panel data analysis. 
Uncontrolled endogeneity can substantially bias estimates and lead to misleading inferences 
and unhealthy policy recommendations. Dynamic panel data analysis addresses this 
endogeneity issue by using lagged values of exogenous variables as instruments.  
 The principal downside linked with dynamic panel data analysis is using data-averages 
over shorter time spans. Consequently, the estimated results reveal short-run impacts and not 
long-term effects, which should be kept in mind when interpreting and discussing results. The 
redeeming feature however is that, the use of average data mitigates short-run disturbances 
that may loom substantially large.   
 The dynamic panel regression model is expressed as follows: 
tititiytititititititi WOPITFFSDFSD ,,,6,5,4,3,21,10,           (1)             
                                                 
17
 More generally, a variable is endogenous when it is correlated with the error term. Endogeneity can result 
from autoregression with autocorrelated errors, simultaneity or omitted variables and measurement error. 
Moreover, a loop of causality between the dependent parameter and the independent variable results in 
endogeneity.  
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 Where ‘t’ stands for the period and ‘i’ represents a country. FSD  is financial sector 
development; F , financial liberalization (KAOPEN and FDI); T , trade liberalization (trade 
and exports); I , institutional liberalization (Instidex); P , political liberalization (democracy); 
O , other liberalizations (economic freedom and freedom to trade).  tiW ,  is a vector of control 
variables (inflation, government expenditure, human development, economic prosperity, 
foreign aid and population growth)
18
 with 136  y (y being the subscript corresponding to 
the estimated coefficient) ,  i  is a country-specific effect,  t  is a time-specific constant and  
ti ,  an error term.  
 Estimates will be unbiased if and only if, the explaining variables above are strictly 
exogenous. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because: (1) while they have a 
substantial incidence on financial sector development, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out 
because the importance of financial sectors in an economy also have some bearing on the 
plethora of regressors; (2)  the regressors could be correlated with the error term ( ti , ) and; (3) 
country- and time-specific effects could also be correlated with other variables in the model, 
which is often the case with lagged dependent variables included in the equations.  Hence, an 
issue of endogeneity emerges as a result of endogenous regressors.  A way of dealing with the 
problem of the correlation between the individual specific-effect and the lagged dependent 
variables involves eliminating the individual effect by first differencing. Therefore Eq. (1) 
becomes: 
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi IITTFFFSDFSDFSDFSD    
 
                   )()()()()( 1,,11,,1,,61,,5   tititttitiytitititi WWOOPP        (2) 
              
However Eq. (2) presents another concern; estimation by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) is still biased because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous 
independent variable and the error term. In order to tackle this further concern, we estimate 
                                                 
18
 We have already discussed the expected signs of control variables in the Data section.  
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the regression in differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. The technique uses lagged levels of the regressors as 
instruments in the difference equation, and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments 
in the level equation, hence exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged 
dependent variables and the error term. Between the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991) and the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 
1998), we go for the latter with respect to Bond et al. (2001, 3-4)
19
.  
In specifying the dynamic panel system estimation, we opt for the two-step GMM 
because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. In the one-step, the residuals are 
considered to be homoscedastic. The assumption of no auto-correlation in the residuals is 
relevant as past lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the endogenous variables. 
Moreover, the estimation depends on the hypothesis that the lagged values of the dependent 
variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the regression. When the 
error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order auto-correlation of the 
differenced residuals should be significant while their second-order auto-correlation: AR(2) 
should not be. The validity of the instruments is investigated with the Sargan over-identifying 
restrictions (OIR) test. In summary, the main arguments for using the system GMM 
estimation are that: it does not eliminate cross-country variation, it mitigates potential biases 
of the difference estimator in small samples and, it can control for the potential endogeneity 
of all regressors (Asongu, 2013e). 
 
 
                                                 
19
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested 
by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our 
empirical application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent 
empirical growth research”. Bond et al.  (2001, pp. 3-4).  
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4. Empirical analysis and discussion of results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
This section aims to examine the testable hypotheses outlined in Section 2.3.  
Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 below present results on the investigation of Hypothesis 
1, Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 respectively. Regardless of tables, the first 
(last) four columns represent models with the GDP-based (M2-based) financial sector 
competition dependent variables.  The findings of Tables 5-8 are summarized in Table 4 from 
which the following general conclusions could be established. (1) With the exception of the 
economic freedom mechanism, liberalization policies have generally decreased the growth of 
the formal financial sector to the benefit of other financial sectors (see Proposition 5). (2) 
Apart from FDI and economic freedom mechanisms, liberalization policies have been fruitful 
for semi-formal financial sector development at the cost of other financial sectors (see 
Proposition 6). (3) With the exception of economic freedom, both the informal (Proposition 7) 
and non-formal (Proposition 8) sectors have developed owing to liberalizations to the 
detriment of the formal financial sector. (4) Relative to GDP, the semi-informal (Proposition 
2), informal (Proposition 3) and/or non-formal (Proposition 4) financial sectors have also 
generally improved as a result of liberalization. (5) De facto capital account openness (FDI) 
and democracy have been detrimental to formal financial development (relative to GDP) and 
the absence of clear sign in the effect of trade (Proposition 5) is the result of short-run 
disturbances that may loom substantially large in the formal banking sector. Hence, business 
cycle fluctuations affect the results as one move from two to three-year nonoverlapping 
intervals.  
The significant control variables have the expected signs: development assistance, 
government expenditure, population growth and economic prosperity broadly improve 
various financial sectors. The negative incidence of economic freedom on the non-formal 
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(semi-formal and informal) financial sector is due to the weight of its legal component (see 
definition in Section 3.1 and high correlation (0.68) with the institutional index (Instidex) in 
Appendix 3). Accordingly, institutional red-tape and too much regulation greatly deter the 
non-formal financial development (Batuo et al., 2010).  
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of the results 
          
  Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
  Formal F.S Semi-formal F.S Informal F.S Nonformal F.S 
  Prop. 1 Prop.5 Prop.2 Prop.6 Prop.3 Prop.7 Prop.4 Prop.8 
          
Financial Liberalization  KAOPEN  na - + na + + + + 
FDI - na na - na + na + 
          
Trade Liberalization  Trade na ? na na + na + + 
Exports  na - + + + + + + 
          
Institutional Liberalization Instidex na - na + na na na na 
          
Political Liberalization  Democracy - na na + + na na na 
          
Other Liberalizations  TFree na ° ° ° ° ° na ° 
EFree na + - - - - - - 
          
Prop: Proposition. F.S: Financial Sector. KAOPEN: de jure capital account openness. FDI: de facto capital account openness. Instidex: First 
principal component of corruption-control, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulation quality, voice & accountability and political 
stability. TFree: Freedom to Trade. EFree: Economic Freedom. ?: both positive and negative signs. na: not applicable due to insignificant 
estimates. °: not used in the regressions because of issues of overparametization and multicolinearity.  
 
 
 
 One conclusion stands out clear from findings in Table 5 below: globalization has 
generally mitigated the formal financial sector in the interest of other financial sectors. A 
slight exception to this finding that is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings outlined in 
Section 2.1 is the economic freedom channel. The results of Proposition 1 are broadly 
consistent with those of Proposition 5 in this conclusion.  
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Table 5: Two-step System GMM estimation for Hypothesis 1 
  Dependent variable: Formal Financial Development   
  Formal Financial Development (Prop.1) Financial Development Formalization (Prop.5)   
  Two Year NOI  Three Year NOI  Two Year NOI  Three Year NOI  
Constant 0.017 -0.068 0.024 -0.033 -0.131 -0.052 0.052* -0.275** 
 (0.169) (-0.283) (0.291) (-0.257) (-1.413) (-0.362) (1.878) (-2.104) 
Finance_1 1.099*** 1.145*** 1.115*** 1.158*** 1.019*** 1.131*** 1.244*** 1.116*** 
 (17.63) (5.179) (12.28) (9.031) (7.546) (7.712) (36.53) (17.73) 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Kaopen 0.0005 -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.008** -0.002 0.004*** -0.013*** 
 (0.131) (-0.100) (0.515) (0.176) (-2.057) (-0.738) (2.814) (-2.869) 
FDI 0.0006 0.003 -0.002* -0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.0004 -0.003 
 (0.451) (1.200) (-1.649) (-0.602) (0.960) (0.111) (0.899) (-1.425) 
Trade 
Liberalization  
Trade  -0.000 --- 0.000 --- -0.0004*** --- 0.0001* --- 
 (-0.007)  (0.131)  (-2.926)  (1.709) -0.0007 
Exports --- 0.0001 --- -0.000 --- -0.0008** --- (-1.303) 
  (0.194)  (-0.247)  (-2.247)   
Institutional 
&Political 
Liberalizations 
Instidex -0.001 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.0004 -0.011* 
 (-0.222) (1.043) (1.084) (0.329) (0.384) (0.988) (0.261) (-1.646) 
Demo -0.0004 -0.002* -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0001 -0.001 0.0001 0.001 
 (-0.632) (-1.927) (-3.217) (-2.425) (0.247) (-0.652) (0.176) (0.605) 
          
Freedom of Trade  --- -0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (-0.181)       
Economic Freedom  -0.004 --- -0.003 0.002 0.027 --- -0.013*** 0.044** 
 (-0.387)  (-0.284) (0.149) (1.326)  (-3.247) (2.184) 
Inflation  --- --- --- --- -0.0002 -0.0007 --- --- 
     (-0.227) (-0.523)   
Government Expenditure  --- 0.0005 --- --- 0.0003 --- --- --- 
  (0.893)   (0.982)    
Human Development  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Economic Prosperity  --- -0.003*** --- -0.0008 -0.004** -0.004*** --- -0.0006 
  (-3.287)  (-0.488) (-2.067) (-2.862)  (-0.239) 
Foreign Aid -0.000 --- 0.001*** 0.001* ---  0.0003 0.001 
 (0.210)  (3.673) (1.732)   (1.242) (0.807) 
Population Growth Rate 0.002 0.027 --- 0.006 --- 0.005  -0.023 
 (0.282) (0.613)  (0.383)  (0.355)  (-1.584) 
         
Test for AR(2) errors -1.585 -1.614 -1.362 -1.545 -1.407 -0.906 0.821 -1.169 
 [0.112 ] [0.106 ] [0.172 ] [0.122 ] [0.1594] [0.364] [0.411 ] [0.242 ] 
Sargan  OIR test  12.994 6.522 5.103 6.380 8.761 11.490 6.770 8.671 
 [0.976 ] [0.999 ] [0.746 ] [0.604 ] [0.9989] [0.993 ] [0.561 ] [0.370 ] 
Wald(joint) test 2538*** 4600*** 23845*** 1417*** 2605*** 3609*** 2544*** 5066*** 
 [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [ 0.000] [0.0000] [0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. Instidex: Institutional index. NOI: 
Non overlapping interval. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. Prop: Propositions. 
 
 
 
 From the results in Table 6, liberalization policies have generally been instrumental in 
the rise of the semi-formal financial sector. As evidenced from the findings of Proposition 6, 
exceptions to these are the FDI and economic freedoms channels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Two-step System GMM estimation for Hypothesis 2  
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  Dependent variable: Semi-Formal Financial Development   
  Semi-Formal Financial Development (Prop.2)  Financial Development Semi-Formalization 
(Prop.6)   
  Two Year NOI  Three Year NOI  Two Year NOI  Three Year NOI  
constant 0.0002 0.001 -0.003 0.046* -0.003 0.0002 0.038* 0.019 
 (0.228) (0.408) (-0.522) (43.97) (-0.758) (0.047) (1.791) (0.988) 
Finance_1 0.345*** 0.344*** 0.295 1.196*** 0.443*** 0.445*** 0.964*** 0.953*** 
 (3.186) (3.465) (1.289) (43.97) (3.004) (3.034) (27.07) (18.24) 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Kaopen -0.000 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.004** -0.001 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (-0.100) (-0.359) (-0.667) (2.271) (-0.918) (-0.936) (-0.447) (-0.411) 
FDI -0.0002 -0.000 -0.000 0.0004 -0.0007* -0.0006* 0.0004 0.0005* 
 (-0.849) (-0.663) (-0.372) (0.577) (-1.750) (-1.787) (1.499) (1.949) 
Trade 
Liberalization  
Trade  0.000 --- 0.000 --- 0.000 --- -0.000 --- 
 (0.454)  (0.328)  (0.807)  (-0.085)  
Exports --- -0.000 --- 0.0003* --- -0.000 --- 0.0001* 
  (-0.431)  (1.849)  (-0.065)  (1.727) 
Institutional 
&Political 
Liberalizations 
Instidex -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002** 0.0027* 
 (-0.722) (-0.799) (-0.192) (1.232) (-1.486) (-1.454) (2.180) (1.896) 
Demo 0.0001 0.0001 -0.000 -0.0006 0.0006 0.0006* -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.326) (0.698) (-0.078) (-0.909) (1.440) (1.745) (-1.126) (-0.976) 
          
Freedom of Trade  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Economic Freedom  --- --- 0.0004 -0.014** --- --- -0.007** -0.006* 
   (0.433) (-2.336)   (-2.014) (-1.704) 
Inflation  0.000 0.000 0.0001 --- 0.0006 0.0006 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.503) (0.545) (0.730)  (0.952) (0.966) (2.454) (2.042) 
Government Expenditure  -0.000 -0.000 --- --- -0.000 -0.000 --- --- 
 (-0.670) (-0.782)   (-0.529) (-0.733)   
Human Development  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Economic Prosperity  -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0009 --- 0.000 -0.0008* -0.0009* 
 (-0.198) (0.046) (0.206) (1.104)  (0.045) (-1.646) (-1.886) 
Foreign Aid --- --- ---  --- --- 0.0001 0.000 
       (1.207) (0.460) 
Population Growth Rate --- -0.0003 --- 0.008** --- -0.0009 --- 0.004 
  (-0.318)  (2.480)  (-0.444)  (1.603) 
         
Test for AR(2) errors 0.592 0.651 0.964 -0.247 0.046 0.012 0.839 0.757 
 [0.553 ] [0.514 ] [0.334] [0.804 ] [0.962 ] [0.990] [0.400 ] [0.449 ] 
Sargan  OIR test  6.082 4.392 3.560 7.804 6.381 6.304 1.167 1.351 
 [1.000 ] [1.000 ] [0.894] [0.452 ] [0.999 ] [0.999 ] [  0.996] [0.994] 
Wald(joint) test 22.58*** 22.70*** 5.911 3395*** 69.35*** 124.5*** 2926*** 3126*** 
 [0.007 ] [0.011 ] [0.748 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. Instidex: Institutional index. NOI: 
Non overlapping interval. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. Prop: Propositions. 
 
 Table 7 below; on the incidences of liberalization policies on the informal financial 
sector broadly confirm the theoretical underpinnings. This is with the slight exception of the 
economic freedom channel.  
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Table 7: Two-step System GMM estimation for Hypothesis 3 
  Dependent variable: Informal Financial Development   
  Informal Financial Development (Prop.3) Financial Development Informalization (Prop.7)   
  Two Year NOI  Three Year NOI  Two Year NOI  Three Year NOI  
constant 0.023 0.017 0.083** 0.049 0.109 0.020 0.278* 0.206* 
 (0.563) (0.529) (2.511) (1.160) (1.493) (0.373) (1.934) (1.902) 
Finance_1 1.108*** 1.191*** 1.201*** 1.196*** 0.966*** 0.864*** 1.107*** 1.073*** 
 (13.98) (24.20) (33.00) (42.02) (8.212) (5.905) (24.60) (13.94) 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Kaopen 0.002 0.002 0.004** 0.004** 0.009** -0.0003 0.017*** 0.014*** 
 (1.512) (1.174) (2.039) (1.989) (2.432) (-0.072) (3.182) (3.386) 
FDI -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.004** 
 (-0.227) (-0.185) (-0.939) (0.557) (-0.031) (-0.668) (1.256) (2.105) 
Trade 
Liberalization  
Trade  0.0001** --- 0.000 --- 0.0002 --- 0.0004 --- 
 (2.340)  (1.103)  (1.202)  (1.435)  
Exports --- 0.0002** --- 0.0003** --- 0.0007* --- 0.001 
  (2.218)  (2.029)  (1.646)  (1.021) 
Institutional 
&Political 
Liberalizations 
Instidex 0.0003 -0.0001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.006 
 (0.246) (-0.142) (1.168) (1.225) (-0.661) (-0.800) (0.387) (1.062) 
Demo --- 0.0004** -0.0001 -0.0006 --- --- -0.0001 -0.0007 
  (2.379) (-0.324) (-0.939)   (-0.064) (-0.339) 
          
Freedom of Trade  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Economic Freedom  -0.009* -0.007* -0.01*** -0.014* -0.024** -0.010 -0.057** -0.055** 
 (-1.761) (-1.679) (-2.791) (-1.739) (-1.962) (-1.212) (-2.332) (-2.115) 
Inflation  -0.0002 -0.0002 0.000 --- -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.367) (-1.289) (0.194)  (-1.341) (-1.348) (-0.040) (-0.027) 
Government Expenditure  0.000 ---  --- -0.0003 -0.0001 --- --- 
 (0.100)    (-1.280) (-0.665)   
Human Development  --- --- --- --- --- -0.001*** --- --- 
      (-3.065)   
Economic Prosperity  0.0009 0.001** 0.001* 0.0009 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004* 0.004 
 (1.554) (2.155) (1.923) (0.925) (2.174) (2.721) (1.707) (1.074) 
Foreign Aid --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- -0.002 -0.002* 
    (-0.182)   (-1.364) (-1.751) 
Population Growth Rate 0.006** 0.004** --- 0.008** 0.006 0.016 --- 0.031 
 (2.376) (2.191)  (2.007) (0.748) (1.189)  (1.574) 
         
Test for AR(2) errors -1.408 -1.555 0.293 -0.143 -1.286 -1.101 -1.527 -1.394 
 [0.159] [0.119 ] [0.769 ] [0.886 ] [0.198] [0.270] [0.126 ] [0.163] 
Sargan  OIR test  8.114 9.334 6.903 7.996 5.167 3.537 10.344 8.578 
 [0.999] [0.998] [0.547] [0.433 ] [1.000] [1.000 ] [0.241 ] [0.379 ] 
Wald(joint) test 2778*** 3031*** 3760*** 4297*** 6859*** 23374*** 13103*** 12825*** 
 [ 0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. Instidex: Institutional index. NOI: 
Non overlapping interval. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. Prop: Propositions. 
 
 Results on the non-formal (semi-formal and informal) sector in Table 8 below are 
broadly consistent with those of the informal sector in Table 7 above.  
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Table 8: Two-step System GMM estimation for Hypothesis 4   
  Dependent variable: Informal & Semi-formal financial Development(FD)   
  Informal and semi-formal FD (Prop.4)  FD Non-formalization (Prop.8)  
  Two Year NOI  Three Year NOI  Two Year NOI  Three Year NOI  
constant -0.039** 0.026 0.111** 0.068** -0.027 0.088 0.311* 0.230* 
 (-2.285) (0.794) (2.502) (2.362) (-0.822) (1.413) (1.923) (1.895) 
Finance_1 1.156*** 1.170*** 1.221*** 1.201*** 1.067*** 1.098*** 1.095*** 1.069*** 
 (13.27) (19.26) (23.19) (19.28) (13.25) (11.21) (22.67) (13.74) 
 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Kaopen 0.0009 0.003* 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005* 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 
 (0.750) (1.912) (2.736) (3.812) (1.795) (3.693) (3.434) (3.917) 
FDI -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0004 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.003** 
 (-1.186) (-0.687) (-0.584) (0.034) (-1.162) (-1.382) (1.130) (2.414) 
 
Trade 
Liberalization  
Trade  0.0002*** --- 0.0001** --- 0.0004** --- 0.0003 --- 
 (2.702)  (2.020)  (2.336)  (1.159)  
Exports --- 0.0003*** --- 0.0006*** --- 0.0008** --- 0.001 
  (0.001)  (3.591)  (2.125)  (1.435) 
 
Institutional 
&Political 
Liberalizations 
Instidex 0.0004 0.0004 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.007 
 (0.220) (0.281) (1.309) (1.113) (-0.349) (1.115) (0.467) (1.284) 
Demo --- 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 --- --- 0.0004 -0.0004 
  (1.030) (-0.295) (0.823)   (0.210) (-0.192) 
          
Freedom of Trade  -0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-0.769)        
Economic Freedom  --- -0.010** -0.02*** -0.021*** --- -0.028** -0.064** -0.063** 
  (-2.119) (-3.253) (-3.741)  (-2.512) (-2.428) (-2.459) 
Inflation  --- 0.0000 --- 0.0001 --- 0.0003 0.001 0.001 
  (0.024)  (0.448)  (0.395) (0.588) (0.797) 
Government Expenditure  0.000 --- --- --- -0.0004 --- --- --- 
 (0.870)    (-1.086)    
Economic Prosperity  0.001* 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004* 0.004 
 (1.840) (2.516) (3.079) (2.387) (2.050) (2.799) (1.646) (1.143) 
Foreign Aid --- --- 0.0001 0.0001  --- -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.422) (0.525)   (-1.036) (-1.395) 
Population Growth Rate 0.011*** 0.006*** --- 0.009*** 0.005 0.004 --- 0.035* 
 (3.359) (0.004)  (2.905) (0.596) (0.399)  (1.902) 
         
Test for AR(2) errors -1.597 -1.521 0.460 0.886 -1.511 -1.988** -1.033 -0.899 
 [0.110] [0.128 ] [0.645 ] [0.375 ] [0.130 ] [0.046] [0.301 ] [0.368 ] 
Sargan  OIR test  8.047 12.79*** 7.688 6.734 7.413 16.005 9.707 8.211 
 [0.999 ] [0.979 ] [0.464] [0.565 ] [0.999] [0.914] [0.286 ] [0.413 ] 
Wald(joint) test 3268*** 1368*** 2855*** 2289*** 4076*** 2856*** 12408*** 10826*** 
 [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000  ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. Instidex: Institutional index. NOI: 
Non overlapping interval. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. Prop: Propositions. 
 
 
4.2 Discussion of results, policy implications and recommendations  
 The findings have broadly confirmed the conventional view which sustains that 
liberalization increases informality. The slight exception of the economic freedom parameter 
to this mainstream wisdom is also in accordance with Fugazza & Fiess (2010) on the position 
that the consensus is not universal. Though the view may not be universal, it is widely 
believed that liberalization may boost the informal financial sector in Africa for the following 
reasons, inter alia.  (1) In attempts to mitigate production cost, domestic producers will seek 
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to informally produce inputs from cheaper sources in order to reap of the benefits from 
informal production because informal producers for the most part do not comply with fiscal 
and legal regulations (Aryeetey, 2005; Bairagya, 2010; Adeusi et al., 2012). (2) Openness has 
not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in financial allocation efficiency (Asongu, 
2012c), leading to substantial issues of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions 
(Fouda, 2009; Saxegaard, 2006). Hence, there has been an increase in the demand for 
informal financial services (Aryeetey, 2005) to meet up the growing demand for investment 
needs in the continent (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Alagidede, 2008; Bartels et al., 2009; 
Tuomi , 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Darley, 2012; Asongu, 2012d). This general positive 
nexus with the informal financial sector is also in line with recent African development 
literature that has established a positive correlation between the informal financial sector and 
soaring trends of mobile banking (Asongu, 2013a) and knowledge economy (Asongu, 2012a). 
 The findings have also shown that the economic freedom channel is an exception to 
the predictions from the theoretical underpinnings. Accordingly, while economic freedom 
improves the formal financial sector, it consistently mitigates its semi-formal and informal 
financial counterparts. The explanation to this exception is simple: economic freedom has 
consistently been found (using the same dataset and time span) to improve financial allocation 
efficiency (Asongu, 2013d), which ultimately diminishes issues of surplus liquidity and 
eventual recourse for informal financial services. It is also interesting to note that the effect of 
the economic freedom index may be due to the substantial weight of its legal structure 
component. The intuition for this interpretation is consistent with the Public interest theory 
which holds that regulation is supplied to correct inefficient market practices and the informal 
sector often circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of 
regulatory capital controls (Edwards, 1999). 
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 The empirical results which are based on a rethinking of the financial system 
definition have shown consistently that the informal financial sector grows after liberalization 
policies. Hence, consistent with Adeusi et al. (2012), the positive role played by the informal 
financial intermediary market has been established in this paper and thus, doubts have been 
raised about mainstream orthodox thinking in policy prescriptions which are essentially based 
on the role of a financial system without the informal sector. The principal policy 
recommendation is that adequate consideration and proper recognition should be given 
informal financial institutions in the financial system of African countries. These will create 
incentives for more research that is focused on the underground economy and induce more 
policy measures that regulate the informal economy.  
 Our paper has focused on the incidence of a plethora of liberalization initiatives on 
financial sector competition. However, further research attention should be devoted to 
assessing how these dynamics have affected investment and growth. Moreover, investigating 
the effect of the relationship on Africa’s two most important development concerns 
(unemployment and poverty) is also an interesting future research direction. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated how financial, trade, institutional and political 
liberalization policies have affected financial sector competition in Africa using updated data 
to appraise second generation reforms. The ‘freedom to trade’ and ‘economic freedom’ 
indices have been employed. Hitherto, unexplored financial sector concepts of formalization, 
semi-formalization, informalization and non-formalization have also been introduced.  
From sound theoretical and empirical underpinnings, four hypotheses have been 
assessed based on eight propositions in order to challenge existing views in many dimensions 
inter alia: the definition of the financial system; disentangling the existing measurement into 
formal and semi-formal financial sectors and; adding the previously missing informal sector 
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to the definition. These assessments broadly represent a threefold contribution to existing 
literature. First, we have focused on financial sector competition and steered clear of the 
mainstream more specific elements of banking market structure like bank concentration and 
foreign bank participation. Second, we have united two streams of research by contributing at 
the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and 
responded to the growing field of economic development by means of informal sector 
promotion, microfinance, mobile banking, knowledge economy…etc, in suggesting a 
practicable way to disentangle the effects of various liberalization policies on financial 
sectors. This has led to the introduction of absolute and relative measures of financial sector 
importance as well as hitherto unexplored concepts of financial sector formalization, semi-
formalization, informalization and non-formalization. Third, by employing a plethora of 
liberalization policies (financial, trade, institutional, political et al.), we have presented a 
broad and exhaustive picture of the nexuses among liberalization policies and financial sector 
importance. Moreover, as opposed to past studies, the use of an updated data span (1996-
2010) that captures second generation reforms has provided results with more focused and 
updated policy implications.  
The empirical analyses which are based on principal component analysis and an 
endogeneity robust dynamic system GMM estimation have led to the following findings. 
Firstly, relative to money supply: (1) with the exception of the economic freedom mechanism, 
liberalization policies have generally decreased the growth of the formal financial sector to 
the benefit of other financial sectors; (2) apart from the foreign direct investment and 
economic freedom channels, liberalization policies have been fruitful for semi-formal 
financial development at the cost of other financial sectors and; (3) with the exception of 
economic freedom, both the informal and non-formal sectors have developed owing to 
liberalization to the detriment of the formal financial sector. Secondly, relative to GDP, the 
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semi-formal, informal and/or non-formal financial sectors have also generally improved as a 
result of liberalization. Policy implications and future research directions have been discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Segments of the financial system by degree of formality in Paper’s context  
Paper’s context Tiers Definitions Institutions Principal Clients 
 
Formal 
financial 
system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMF  
Definition of 
Financial 
System from 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
(IFS) 
 
Formal 
Financial 
sector 
(Deposit 
Banks) 
 
Formal 
banks 
 
 
 
 
Licensed by 
central bank 
 
Commercial 
and 
development 
banks  
 
Large businesses, 
Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-
formal  
and 
informal 
financial 
systems 
 
 
 
Semi-formal 
financial 
sector 
(Other 
Financial 
Institutions) 
Specialized 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
Rural banks, 
Post banks, 
Saving and 
Loan 
Companies, 
Deposit taking 
Micro Finance 
banks  
 
Large rural 
enterprises, Salaried 
Workers, Small and 
medium enterprises  
 
 
Other non-
bank 
financial 
institutions 
Legally 
registered but 
not licensed as 
financial 
institution by 
central bank and 
government 
 
 
Credit Unions, 
Micro Finance 
NGOs 
 
 
Microenterprises, 
Entrepreneurial 
poor 
 
 
Missing 
component 
in IFS 
definition 
 
 
Informal 
financial 
sector 
 
 
Informal 
banks 
Not legally 
registered at 
national level 
(though may be 
linked  to a 
registered 
association) 
 
Savings 
collectors, 
Savings and 
credit 
associations, 
Money lenders 
 
 
 
Self-employed poor 
Source (Asongu, 2012a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Appendix 2: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Panel A: GDP based financial variables   
    
Formal Financial 
Development  
Prop.1 Bank deposits/GDP. Bank deposits here refer to 
demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks (Lines 24 and 25 of International Financial 
Statistics (IFS); October 2008).  
Asongu (2012a) 
    
Semi-formal  financial 
development 
Prop.3   (Financial deposits – Bank deposits)/ GDP.    
Financial deposits are demand, time and saving 
deposits in deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions. (Lines 24, 25 and 45 of IFS, October, 
2008). 
Asongu (2012a) 
    
Informal  financial 
development 
Prop.3 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/GDP Asongu (2012a) 
    
Informal and semi-formal 
financial development  
Prop.4 (Money  Supply –  Bank deposits)/GDP Asongu (2012a) 
    
Panel B: M2 based financial variables   
    
Financial intermediary 
formalization 
Prop.5 Bank deposits/ Money Supply (M2). From ‘informal 
and semi-formal’ to formal financial development 
(formalization) 
Asongu (2012a) 
    
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization’ 
Prop.6 (Financial deposits - Bank deposits)/ Money Supply. 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal financial 
development (Semi-formalization) 
Asongu (2012a) 
    
Financial intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
Prop.7 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/ Money Supply. 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal financial 
development (Informalisation). 
Asongu (2012a) 
    
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization and 
informalization’ 
Prop.8 (Money Supply – Bank Deposits)/Money Supply.  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ financial 
development: (Semi-formalization and 
informalization). 
Asongu(2012a) 
    
Panel C: Liberalization Independent Variables 
 
Financial Liberalization 1 KAOPEN De Jure Capital Openness Chinn & Ito (2002) 
    
Financial Liberalization 2 FDI  Foregin Direct Investment(% of GDP) WDI(World Bank) 
    
Trade Liberalization 1  Trade Imports + Exports of Commodities(% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Liberalization 2  Export Exports of Good & Services(% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Institutional Liberalisation1 Instidex 1
st
 Principal Component of: RL; RQ; CC;V&A; PS; GE P.C Analysis  
    
Democracy  Demo Institutionalized Democracy(Estimate) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Freedom  TFree Freedom of Trade Index  Gwartney et al. 
(2011). Economic 
Freedom Dataset 
   
Economic Freedom  EcoFree Economic Freedom Index  
   
Panel D: Control Variables  
    
Inflation  Inflation Consumer Price Index (Annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Government Expenditure GE Government Final Expenditure (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
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Human Development  IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index WDI (World Bank) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Foreign-Aid  NODA Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Population Growth  Popg Population Growth Rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: Principal Component. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: 
Corruption-Control. V& A: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability. GE: Government Effectiveness.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation analysis 
Financial (Fin) Dependent Variables Liberalization (Lib) Independent Variables Control Variables 
GDP-Based Measures Sector Importance Measures Fin. Lib. Trade Lib. Inst & Pol. Lib Other Libs  
Infl 
 
GE 
 
IHDI 
 
GDPg 
 
NODA 
 
Popg 
 
 Prop1 Prop2 Prop3 Prop4 Prop5 Prop6 Prop7 Prop8 KAOP FDI Trade Exports Instidex Demo TFree EFree 
1.000 0.076 0.099 0.110 0.598 -0.038 -0.590 -0.590 -0.375 0.040 0.290 0.290 0.519 0.187 0.209 0.499 -0.098 -0.02 0.09 0.041 -0.433 -0.61 Prop1 
 1.000 0.104 0.278 -0.065 0.884 -0.134 -0.134 -0.016 -0.08 -0.01 -0.030 0.037 0.002 -0.02 -0.03 0.066 -0.01 -0.04 0.031 0.006 -0.00 Prop2 
  1.000 0.984 -0.606 -0.030 0.613 0.613 0.002 -0.05 -0.06 -0.044 -0.110 -0.18 -0.02 -0.15 -0.142 0.00 -0.11 -0.06 0.019 -0.00 Prop3 
   1.000 -0.597 0.166 0.559 0.559 -0.009 -0.06 -0.06 -0.048 -0.100 -0.18 -0.02 -0.15 0.123 0.00 -0.12 -0.05 0.019 -0.00 Prop4 
    1.000 -0.111 -0.974 -0.974 0.354 0.158 0.339 0.352 0.605 0.26 0.34 0.618 0.060 0.05 0.18 0.071 -0.332 -0.39 Prop5 
     1.000 -0.111 -0.111 -0.104 -0.09 -0.02 -0.071 -0.013 0.067 -0.06 -0.08 0.194 -0.04 -0.03 0.019 0.134 0.10 Prop6 
      1.000 1.000 -0.330 -0.13 -0.33 -0.336 -0.606 -0.27 -0.33 -0.60 -0.105 -0.05 -0.17 -0.07 0.301 0.36 Prop7 
       1.000 -0.330 -0.13 -0.33 -0.336 -0.606 -0.27 -0.33 -0.60 -0.105 -0.05 -0.17 -0.07 0.301 0.36 Prop8 
        1.000 0.058 0.050 0.110 0.300 0.188 0.542 0.692 0.117 0.04 -0.11 0.091 -0.206 -0.11 KAOP 
         1.000 0.470 0.107 0.094 0.010 0.331 0.306 -0.302 0.07 -0.03 0.095 -0.015 -0.15 FDI 
          1.000 0.840 0.472 0.193 0.451 0.344 -0.110 0.04 -0.12 -0.02 -0.25 -0.42 Trade 
           1.000 0.507 0.154 0.464 0.380 -0.019 0.02 -0.09 -0.08 -0.48 -0.43 Exports 
            1.000 0.542 0.574 0.680 -0.009 -0.00 0.13 0.146 -0.409 -0.34 Instidex 
             1.000 0.324 0.381 0.152 0.01 0.11 0.125 -0.016 -0.08 Demo 
              1.000 0.770 0.230 0.01 0.08 0.097 -0.429 -0.19 TFree 
               1.000 0.084 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.021 -0.37 EFree 
                1.000 -0.17 0.04 0.021 0.178 0.09 Infl 
                 1.00 -0.22 0.214 0.040 0.02 GE 
                  1.00 -0.05 -0.095 0.01 IHDI 
                   1.000 0.158 0.23 GDPg 
                    1.000 0.50 NODA 
                     1.00 Popg 
                       
 Prop: Proposition. KAOP: De Jure measure of Capital Openness. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Instidex: Institutional Development Index. Demo: Democracy. TFree: Freedom   to Trade. EFree: Economic Freedom. 
Infl: Inflation. GE: Government Expenditure. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. GDPg: GDP growth rate. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance.  Popg: Population growth rate.  Inst. & Pol: 
Institutional and Political.  
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